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THE DUTY TO SERVE AND PROTECT: 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 AND POLICE OFFICERS' LIABILITY
FOLLOWING ROADSIDE ABANDONMENT
Michael R. Gotham
Abstract: Courts disagree about whether an individual has a cause of action against a
police officer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when that officer abandoned the individual in a dangerous environment following a traffic stop. Courts have not uniformly recognized an
individual's right to personal security in roadside abandonment cases as fundamental and
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Also, courts have required plaintiffs in these
cases to show that an asserted right was clearly established at the time the officer acted in
order to overcome the officer's qualified immunity defense. This requirement often bars
plaintiffs from recovering under section 1983. This Comment argues that roadside abandonment violates the Fourteenth Amendment and is actionable under section 1983. This
Comment also asserts that a showing of a police officer's deliberate indifference to the
plaintiff's peril should be sufficient to defeat the defense of qualified immunity.

Late one evening in 1990 Kathy Hilliard was a passenger in a car
driven by her boyfriend. The car was involved in a minor traffic accident. The officer who arrived at the scene arrested Kathy's boyfriend
for driving while intoxicated and impounded the car. The officer, after
determining that Kathy was also intoxicated, ordered her not to drive.
Then the officer released Kathy from custody and departed, leaving
her alone in a high crime area, late at night and without transportation. Later, Kathy was robbed and raped. She was discovered the
following morning-naked, bleeding, and barely conscious.'
Does Kathy have a cause of action for roadside abandonment
against the police officer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983? To maintain a suit
successfully under section 1983, Kathy must satisfy a two-pronged
test. First, she must show that the officer caused her injuries while
acting under color of state law.2 Second, she must show that the
officer's action violated a federally protected right.' After Kathy fulfills these requirements, however, the officer can assert the defense of
qualified immunity.4 To overcome this defense, Kathy must show that
her federally protected right was clearly established at the time the
1. The facts represented in this scenario are derived from Hilliard v. City & County of
Denver, 930 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 656 (1991).
2. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
3. Id.
4. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980).
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officer acted and that a reasonable officer would have known of the
right. 5
This Comment argues that plaintiffs in roadside abandonment cases
satisfy the two-part test necessary for a successful cause of action
under section 1983. In most roadside abandonment cases, the police
officer impounds the car, orders the plaintiff not to drive, and then
abandons the plaintiff while acting under color of law, thereby causing
the plaintiff's injuries. By abandoning and thus worsening the plaintiff's position, the officer violates an individual's constitutional right to
personal security. The officer also violates the individual's constitutional right to receive care and protection when in state custody. In
addition, this Comment addresses the problem of circularity that
arises from the standard required to overcome the qualified immunity
defense. Plaintiffs are effectively barred from recovering in roadside
abandonment cases by the requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate that
their right was clearly established at the time the officer acted. This
Comment asserts that the plaintiff should be able to overcome the
qualified immunity defense by showing that the officer was deliberately
indifferent to the danger that the officer imposed on the plaintiff.
I.

SECTION 1983-THE ROUTE TO RECOVERY

A.

The History and Purpose of Section 1983

Following the Civil War, the Reconstruction Congress pursued an
extensive program of legislation to counter the effects of the Southern
Black Codes6 and protect the rights of recently emencipated black citizens.7 The legislation was passed under the authority granted to Congress by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteen'th Amendments to
the United States Constitution.8 As part of this program, the legislature enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871, also known as the Ku Klux
Klan Act.9 Section 1983 of the statute provides a cause of action
against any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives a
citizen of the United States of any rights, privileges, or immunities
5. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
6. Following the abolition of slavery, all Southern states, with the exceptions of Arkansas and
Tennessee, enacted Black Codes. The Codes were designed to keep black citizens in a
subordinate position closer to slavery than freedom. MILTON KONVITZ, A CENTURY OF CIVIL
RIGHTS 14 n.26, 15 (1961).
7. See THEODORE EISENBERG, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION 3-4 (2d ed. 1987).
8. See JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW §§ 15.1-15.12 (3d ed. 1986).
9. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, §1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §1983

(1988)).
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secured by the Constitution or other federal law.1" The federal act
provided the means to remedy the failure of some states and state officials to enforce the laws equally." Although the Act primarily
targeted the activities of the Ku Klux Klan, it did not provide a remedy against the Klan or Klan members."2 Instead, the Act provided a
federal remedy against state agencies and officials that were unable or
unwilling to enforce federal protections.1 3
Although Congress enacted the statute in 1871, section 1983
remained generally unused until 1961, when the Supreme Court resurrected it in Monroe v. Pape.1 4 In Monroe, the Court held thirteen
police officers liable under section 1983 after they burst into a black
family's home in the early morning, rousted them from bed, forced the
family to stand naked in the living room, and ransacked the entire
house. 15 The state officers also took the father into custody, detained
and interrogated him for ten hours, but failed to bring him before a
magistrate, even though one was available. 16 The Supreme Court held
that, although the officers had no authority to take these particular
actions, they acted under color of law. 17 The Court stated that the
officers abused the power provided by state law and acted while
clothed with the authority provided by state law."8 In addition, the
Court held that the officers' conduct violated the plaintiffs' right to be
free from unreasonable search and seizure, 19 guaranteed by the Fourth
10. Section 1983 states in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
11. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174-80 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell v.
Department of Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
12. Id. at 175-76.
13. Id. at 174-80.
14. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Department of Social Servs.
of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

15. Id. at 169.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 181-87; see also Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1879) (actions of a state
officer who exceeds the limits of his authority constitute state action for purposes of Fourteenth
Amendment).

18. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 181-87 ("Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and
made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action
taken 'under color of' state law.") (citing United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)).
19. Id. at 170-71.
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Amendment (and applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment).20
Actions Under Section 1983: The Two-Pronged Test

B.

To sustain an action under section 1983, a plaintiff must satisfy two
requirements. First, the plaintiff must show that the defendant official
acted under color of state law.2 1 Second, the plaintiff must show that
the official's action violated a federally protected right.2 2
State Action and Section 1983s "Color of Law" Requirement

1.

Section 1983 imposes liability on "[e]very person who, under color
of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage" violates the
federal rights of another.2 3 In an action brought against a state official
under section 1983, the "color of law" requirement is identical to the
Fourteenth Amendment's state action requirement.24 Because the
Fourteenth Amendment addresses the states, only conduct properly
characterized as "state action" may violate that amendment's Due
Process Clause.25 The doctrine of state action requires that the exercise of power granted by the state cause the deprivation and that the
defendant be fairly characterized as a state actor.2 6 Color of law
involves "[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made
possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of
state law."2 7 The Supreme Court has held that when the challenged
20. Id.; see Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S 206, 213 (1960); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949). Additionally, the Court held that a state law that provided relief did not bar the federal
action-any constitutional remedies available under § 1983 were supplementary to the remedies
available under state law. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183. Exhausting state administrative remedies is
not required under § 1983. Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982).
21. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
22. Id.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
24. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 929 (1982). Tle Court stated that state
action exists when a creditor attaches a debtor's property under the Virginia statute. Id. at
941-42.
25. Id. at 924.
26. Id. at 937; see Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (state agents aided in
executing a vendor's lien); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (enforcement of state statute
authorizing prejudgment replevin); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (state
agent aided creditor in state-created garnishment procedure).
27. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941), overruled oz other grounds by Monell
v. Department of Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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conduct of a state official constitutes state action, it also meets the
color of law requirement for the purposes of section 1983.28
2. FederalRights Protected by Section 1983
Section 1983 enforces the "rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the [Federal] Constitution and [other federal] laws." 29 Section
1983, by itself, provides no substantive rights.3 0 The statute, which is
procedural in nature, only provides a federal cause of action following
an alleged violation of a federally protected right.31 Thus, the plaintiff's right asserted under section 1983 must be found in either the
Federal Constitution or a federal statute. The Fourteenth Amendment, which says that "[no] State [shall] deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law,"3 2 provides one
source of federal rights for suits brought under section 1983. Moreover, as the title to section 1983 indicates, the primary purpose of section 1983 is to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.3 3 Thus,
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence repeatedly arises in section
1983 litigation.
The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause incorporates
numerous rights and applies them to the states. These rights include
many of the protections guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. 34 The substantive element of the Due Process Clause also protects other fundamental rights that are not explicitly enumerated in the Constitution.35
The plaintiff who asserts a right not specifically enumerated in the
Constitution must establish that the right is fundamental and thus
warrants constitutional protection.3 6 When considering a claim of
substantive due process, courts balance the interests of the individual
against those of society.37
28. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 935. It does not follow that because conduct satisfies the under color
of state law requirement, it also satisfies the Fourteenth Amendment requirement of state action.
Id. at 935 n.18.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
30. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979).
31. Id.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
33. "An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, and for other Purposes." 17 Stat. 13 (1871); Sheldon Nahmod, Constitutional
Accountability in Section 1983 Litigation, 68 IowA L. RPv. 1, 19 (1982).
34. See NOWAK ET AL., supra note 8,at 364-66.
35. See infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
36. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 539-45 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
37. Poe, 367 U.S. at 542, 545-46 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that substantive due process
is a balance between "respect for the liberty of the individual... and the demands of organized
society," which includes the physical well-being and moral soundness of the community).
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Fundamental rights include the freedom of asscciation,3 8 the right
to fairness in the criminal process3 9 and in procedures against the government for deprivations of life, liberty, or property, ° and the right to
privacy.4 The Supreme Court has interpreted the fundamental right
to liberty very broadly.4 2 The right is not confined merely to freedom
from physical restraint.43 Among the rights included in the liberty
interest is the right to be free from and to receive relief for unjustified
intrusions on personal security.'
a. Roadside Abandonment Cases: Conflict Among the Circuit
Courts
The courts that have decided roadside abandonment cases have
addressed the plaintiff's rights in such cases in terms of the fundamental right to liberty. These courts, however, have not agreed on how
they will apply the right to liberty in cases of roadside abandonment.
In White v. Rochford,45 the Seventh Circuit held police officers liable
for abandoning three children in a car adjacent -to a busy, limitedaccess highway in inclement weather.' The officers arrested the chil38. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-23 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,
460-61 (1958).
39. See, eg., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (right to legal materials and access to
courts); Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971) (right to transcript in misdemeanor
appeals); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to counsel in first appeal).
40. The Supreme Court sometimes defines the scope of constitutional protection for a
fundamental right as it rules on the procedures constitutionally required to avoid the unjustified
deprivations of such rights in individual cases. NOWAK ET AL., supra note 8, 371 n.23; see, eg.,
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (persons involuntarily committed to state mental
hospital have a constitutional right to safe conditions and professional judgment regarding their
care).
41. This right includes freedom of choice in marital decisions, Bxddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371 (1971), Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), child bearing, see Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (purchase of contraceptives), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(abortions), and child rearing, see Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (private
education), Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
42. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
43. Id.
44. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977) (refused to invalidate corporal punishment
under procedural due process because existing state procedures provided all the process that was
due); Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 589 (9th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 111 S.Ct. 341 (1990);
White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 383-84 (7th Cir. 1979). The Due Process Clause gives U.S.
citizens at a minimum the protection against government power that they enjoyed as English
subjects against the power of the crown. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 672; see 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134. Under the 39th Article of the Magna Carta, individuals
could not be deprived of their right to personal security "except by the legal judgment of [their]
peers or by the law of the land." RICHARD L. PERRY & JOHN C. COOPER, SOURCES OF OUR
LIBERTIES 17 (1978).
45. 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979).
46. Id.
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dren's uncle and refused to help the children contact their parents,
despite the uncle's insistence that the officers help the children do so.4 7
One of the children was an asthmatic and was subsequently hospital4 9 the Ninth Circuit
ized for a week.4" Likewise, in Wood v. Ostrander,
held a state trooper liable when, after arresting the driver and
impounding the car in which the plaintiff was riding, the trooper left a
female passenger alone in an area with one of the highest aggravated
crime rates in the county. 0 The woman was subsequently raped."'
In both decisions, the courts found that the officers acted under
color of law and that the officers' conduct violated a clearly established
liberty right. These courts determined that when an officer conducts a
traffic stop, makes an arrest, and impounds a vehicle, the officer acts as
an agent of the state and under color of state authority. 52 The courts
stated that the officers' conduct, which placed the individuals in a perilous situation, violated the plaintiffs' liberty interest in personal security.53 According to the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, a reasonable
officer should have known of the plaintiffs' rights because those rights
were clearly established at the time the officers acted. 4
The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, however, disagree with the results
in White and Wood. In Hilliard v. City & County of Denver,5 5 the
Tenth Circuit held that an officer was not liable under section 1983 for
abandoning a woman in a high crime area after arresting her companion, who was driving while intoxicated. 6 After being left by the police,
the woman was sexually assaulted and found the following morning
naked, bleeding, and barely conscious.5 7 In another case, Courson v.
McMillian,5 8 the Eleventh Circuit held an officer not liable when he
arrested a woman's companions and then abandoned her alone at
night without transportation.5 9
47. Id. at 382.
48. Id.
49. 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 341 (1990).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 586.
52. Id. at 587; White, 592 F.2d at 383.
53. Wood, 879 F.2d at 589; White, 592 F.2d at 383-84.
54. See Wood, 879 F.2d at 594-95; White, 592 F.2d at 384-85.
55. 930 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 656 (1991); see also supra note 1 and
accompanying text (describing facts of Hilliard).
56. Hilliard,930 F.2d at 1517.
57. Id. at 1518.
58. 939 F.2d 1479 (lth Cir. 1991).
59. The plaintiff did not suffer physical injuries but brought suit for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Id. at 1485.
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The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits both held that the plaintiffs' constitutionally protected liberty interest in personal safety was not
clearly established at the time the officers abandoned them.' These
courts refused to hold that the right to care and protection applied in
cases lacking state imposed custody or confinement. 61 Although
acknowledging that such a right had been establi3hed in White and
Wood, these courts refused to follow those decisions because the lower
courts disagreed regarding when, if ever, the state owed protective
services under the Due Process Clause.6 2 Because these courts found
that the legal question regarding the plaintiffs' rights was unanswered
at the time the officers acted, the courts granted the officers qualified
immunity. 63
b. State Custody and the Right to Care and Protection
In limited circumstances, individuals may assert a constitutional
right to receive care and protection from the state." In general, however, individuals do not have a right under the Due Process Clause to
affirmative aid from the state.65 The Due Process Clause only provides
protection against unwarranted government interference; 66 it does not
create an entitlement to state aid, which may be necessary to realize
fully the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. 67 Thus, individuals
generally do not have a right to state protection from the violent acts
of third parties.6 8 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has recognized an
exception to this rule when the state assumes custody over an individual, thereby directly impairing the individual's capacity for self-protection.6 9 The Court has only recognized this duty in cases of
60. Id. at 1497-98; Hilliard, 930 F.2d at 1520.
61. Courson, 939 F.2d at 1497 n.31; Hilliard,930 F.2d at 1520.
62. Courson, 939 F.2d at 1497-98 & n.31; Hilliard, 930 F.2d at 1520 (citing DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989)).
63. Courson, 939 F.2d at 1497 n.31, 1498; Hilliard,930 F.2d at 1519.
64. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198-200.
65. Id. at 195-97.
66. See, eg., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause is intended "to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of
government," and "to prevent governmental power from being 'used for purposes of
oppression' ").
67. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195-97; see, eg., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980)
(state not obliged to fund abortions or other medical services under Fifth Amendment); Lindsey
v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (state not obliged to provide adequate housing under
Fourteenth Amendment).
68. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195-97.
69. Id. at 198-200.
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misfeasance; it has refused to extend the exception to cases where the
state took no affirmative action. 70
i

State Action, Custody and Affirmative Duty

When the state restricts the freedom of individuals to act on their
own behalf and thereby worsens their position, courts impose an
affirmative duty on the state to provide care and protection to those
individuals. 7 1 For example, when the state incarcerates an individual,
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment imposes a duty to provide medical attention.7 2 The same
affirmative obligation extends to involuntarily committed mental
patients and pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of due process.7 3 In each of these situations, the state must
provide the individual with reasonable safety and protection from
himself and third parties, including other inmates.7 4
iM State Inaction: DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of
Social Services
In contrast to cases involving state action, the Supreme Court finds
no state duty to provide care and protection in cases involving state
inaction. In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
Services,75 county officials received repeated reports indicating that
Joshua DeShaney was a victim of continuing child abuse.7 6 Although
Wisconsin had a system for protecting victims of child abuse, the officials failed to place the boy in the protective custody of the state.77 As
a result of continued abuse, the child suffered permanent and severe
brain damage. 8
70. Id. at 200.
71. Id.
72. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976).
73. City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239 (1983) (holding that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that states insure that persons injured
while being apprehended by police officers receive medical attention); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457
U.S. 307 (1982) (holding that substantive due process requires that state provide mental patients
with services necessary to ensure safety, freedom of movement, and training; dicta indicating that
state must provide food, shelter, clothing, and medical care).
74. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986); Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315-16, 320; Archie v.
Racine, 847 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989); Curtis v. Everette, 489
F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1973), cert denied sub nom Smith v. Curtis, 416 U.S. 995 (1974).
75. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
76. Id. at 192-93.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 193.
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The DeShaney Court held that the due process clause does not create a general right to affirmative aid from the state.79 The Court recognized that state action may create a right to affirmative aid in
limited circumstances;80 however, the Court found no state action in
DeShaney.1 Making a critical distinction between omission and commission," the Court required that an affirmative act by the state
directed at the plaintiff cause the injury.8" Although Wisconsin state
officials knew of the danger Joshua faced, they neither created that
84
danger nor made the boy more vulnerable to the tireat of violence.
The officials "stood by and did nothing"; 5 only Randy DeShaney,
Joshua's father, inflicted the terrible injuries on the boy.8 6 Because the
state failed to act, the court found no state action. Thus, Joshua did
not have a right to care from and protection by the state under the
87
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
C. Immunity from Liability: The Third Hurdle
A plaintiff who brings a section 1983 cause of action against a state
official should expect the official to assert the defense of qualified
immunity. Qualified immunity exempts public officials who perform
discretionary functions from liability for the consequences of their
decisions. Providing immunity to these officials balances two conflicting policy concerns. 8 On the one hand, an action for damages against
the state often provides the only practical means for an individual to
redress deprivations of constitutional rights.8 9 On the other hand, if
individuals may sue officials for every error in judgment, society bears
the burden of the diversion of resources away from important public
concerns.' The threat of liability may also deter capable persons from
accepting public office. 9 1
79. Id. at 196.
80. Id. at 198-200.
81. Ide at 201, 203.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 200.
84. Id.
85. Id at 203.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 199-201.
88. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813-14 (1982).
89. Id.; see Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 505 (1978); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971).
90. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814.
91. The fear of being sued may "dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute or the most
irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties." Id. (quoting
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950)).
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State officials typically enjoy either absolute or qualified immunity
depending on the degree of discretion or responsibility of that official. 92 Absolute immunity gives government entities or officials complete protection from liability. Officials with absolute immunity are
immune from suit under section 1983 as long as they acted within the
scope of their official duty.93 State legislators,9 4 judges,95 and prosecutors9 6 enjoy absolute immunity from section 1983 liability. State governments also are absolutely immune. 97 Most executive officials and
government employees, however, receive only qualified immunity.9 8
To maintain a successful defense of qualified immunity, defendant
officials must show that they did not violate a right that was clearly
established when the officials acted. 99 Officials are not expected to
anticipate legal developments or know that the law forbids conduct
that courts have not previously identified as unlawful." ° The unlawfulness must be apparent in light of the pre-existing law."' The constitutional right must be sufficiently clear such that reasonable officials
would understand that their action violates that right.1 2

92. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974) (stating that state governor has
immunity because he or she has broader discretion and considers options that are far broader
that those available to officials with less responsibility).
93. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976).
94. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951).
95. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55
(1967).
96. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427.
97. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979).
98. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982) (presidential aides); Procunier v.
Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561 (1978) (prison officials); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563,
564, 577 (1975) (mental hospital administrators); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321-22
(1975) (school board members); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974) (state
executives); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967) (police officers). Unlike state governments,
local government municipalities only have qualified immunity. See Owen v. City of
Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650 (1980); Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of New York,
436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
99. Although defendant officials must plead the defense of qualified immunity, Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980), it remains unclear as to which party bears the burden of proof on
the qualified immunity defense. Kit Kinports, Qualified Immunity In Section 1983 Cases: The
UnansweredQuestions, 23 GA. L. REv. 597, 599 (1989) (arguing that the defendant official bears
the burden of showing that the right was not clearly established at the time the officer acted).
100. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
101. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987); see, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.
335, 344-45 (1986); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 (1985); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S.
183, 191, 195 (1984).
102. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640.
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ROADSIDE ABANDONMENT: ACTIONABLE UNDER
SECTION 1983

Courts could impose liability on state officials 'who fail to provide
affirmative aid to plaintiffs in roadside abandonment cases. In these
cases, both elements required under section 1983 are satisfied. First,
roadside abandonment cases meet section 1983's "color of law"
requirement because roadside abandonment involves affirmative action
by a state officer. Second, the officer's actions violate the plaintiff's
liberty right guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In addition, the state violates the plaintiff's right to
receive care and protection while in the state's custody. Finally, to
eliminate the dilemma imposed on plaintiffs by the qualified immunity
defense, courts could establish a new standard of "deliberate indifference" sufficient to overcome that defense.
A.

Roadside Abandonment Satisfies Section 1983s Color of Law
Requirement

State action necessarily involves two parts: state and action. Roadside abandonment fulfills both of these components. First, abandoning
an individual constitutes affirmative action. Second, the affirmative
0 3
action of a state officer, rather than a third party, causes the harm.1
1. Abandonment ConstitutesAction Rather than Inaction
In roadside abandonment cases, the conduct of police officers fulfills
section 1983's requirement of action. State action requires affirmative
action by state officials directed at the plaintiff.'" In roadside abandonment cases, police officers stop a car, detain the occupants, arrest
the driver and companions, impound or somehow restrict the use of
the car, and then depart, leaving an individual alone and in a perilous
situation. Together, these several steps create "abandonment": action
that deprives individuals of the safety they enjoyed before encountering a state official.' 0 5 Thus, roadside abandonment cases involve
affirmative action by a state agent.
103. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
104. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989); see also
supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
105. In some instances, the plaintiff might have been in a dangerous situation before the
traffic stop. The plaintiff might have been travelling with a reckless or intoxicated driver.
Courson v. McMillian, 939 F.2d 1479 (11th Cir. 1991) (intoxicated driver); Hilliard v. City &
County of Denver, 930 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.) (intoxicated driver), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 656
(1991); Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989) (intoxicated driver), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 341 (1990); White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979) (reckless driver). Although an
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Compare the following two hypothetical situations. First, suppose
that an officer detains an individual who was travelling through Point
A,"° drives that person from Point A to Point B, 1°7 and then leaves
that individual at Point B, without a means of transportation. This
encounter exemplifies action by a state agent. 108 The officer's actions
intentionally and directly affect the individual's location and capacity
for self-protection. Second, suppose that an officer detains an individual who was travelling through Point B, impounds the individual's
car, and then leaves that person at Point B without a means of transportation. The sole factor distinguishing the two scenarios is the
officer's act of driving the individual from Point A to Point B. In both
scenarios the officer's affirmative actions produce an identical consequence: the individual is at Point B without a means of transportation.
The abandonment, not the driving, produces the outcome. An act like
driving from Point A to Point B should not become the distinguishing
factor between action in the first hypothetical and inaction in the second." 9 In either case, abandonment represents an affirmative action
that produces a definite result.
2

State Action Causes the Actual Injury

State action implicates state causation. Finding state action
depends on whether the action of the officer caused the individual's
injury or whether an intervening factor proves to be primarily responsible.1 10 Consequently, two important questions arise: first, what
harm did the plaintiff suffer; second, to what extent did the state contribute to that harm?
In the abandonment cases, the plaintiff often suffers two injuries: a
worsened position and physical injury. The abandoning official worsens an individual's position by performing actions that dramatically
decrease the personal safety of that person, such as by leaving the
plaintiff alone on the streets at night, making that person a likely tarofficer removes the drunk driver by stopping and arresting that driver, the officer is liable for
finally placing the passenger in a new and dangerous situation. The officer's prior good deed
should not excuse his subsequent wrongdoing. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§324,
445 (1979).
106. For the purposes of these hypotheticals, assume that Point A is in an area of relative
safety.
107. For the purposes of these hypotheticals, assume that Point B is in an area with a high
crime rate.
108. See White, 592 F.2d at 384.
109. See id.
110. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§440-42 (1965).
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get for a rape. 1 1 Worsening the position of another person creates an
affirmative duty to act on that person's behalf. 112 The officer's actions
are the proximate cause of an injury if those actions are a material

element and a substantial factor in bringing about the injuries.113 In
roadside abandonment cases, the state officer substantially contributes
to the plaintiff's physical injuries. Although the pladntiff suffers physical injuries inflicted by a third party, the state officer acts as the primary catalyst. The third party merely takes advantage of the situation
provided by the officer. "But for" the police officer abandoning the
plaintiff, the third party would have had no occasion to inflict injury
on the plaintiff. 14 Thus, the actions of the officer proximately cause
the plaintiff's physical injuries.
Roadside abandonment cases are distinguishable from cases where
action by officials does not affect an individual's environment. In
DeShaney, the state did not directly or indirectly injure Joshua."'
Instead, the county officials maintained the status quo; Joshua
remained in the same vulnerable position before, during, and after
encountering the county social workers.1 16 The proximate cause anal111. See Michael J. Hindelang & Bruce J. Davis, Forcible Rape in the United States: A
87

Statistical Profile, in FORCIBLE RAPE: THE CRIME, THE VICTIM, AND THE OFFENDER

(Duncan Chappell et al. eds., 1977). Among thirteen cities surveyed, nearly one half of all
reported rapes occurred on the street, in a park, field, playground, schoal grounds, or parking lot.
Id. at 94. More than 65% of the rapes occurred in open, outdoor places. Id. Two-thirds of these
rapes occurred between 6 p.m. and 6 a.m. Id. Four out of five completed and attempted rapes
involved offenders who were strangers to the victim. Id. at 95.
112. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955); Schuster v. City of New
York, 154 N.E.2d 534 (N.Y. 1958); Zelenko v. Gimble Bros., 287 N.Y.S. 134 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1935), aff'd, 287 N.Y.S. 136 (1936); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§322, 324 (1965); ef
Riss v. City of New York, 240 N.E.2d 860 (N.Y. 1968).
113. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 267 (5th ed.
1984).
114. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §432 (1965); KEETON ET AL., supra note 113,
at 266-67.
115. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 203 (1989); see
also supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text. But see DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 210 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan stated:
Through its child-welfare program ... Wisconsin has relieved ordinary citizens and
governmental bodies other than the Department of any sense of obligation to do anything
more than report their suspicions of child abuse to DSS. If DSS ignores or dismisses these
suspicions, no one will step in to fill the gap. Wisconsin's child-p:otection program thus
effectively confined Joshua DeShaney within the walls of Randy DShaney's violent home
until such time as DSS took action to remove him. Conceivably, then, children like Joshua
are made worse off by the existence of this program when the persons and entities charged
with carrying it out fail to do their jobs.
It simply belies reality, therefore, to contend that the State "stood by and did nothing"
with respect to Joshua.
Id.
116. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201.
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ysis applied in roadside abandonment cases does not apply in
DeShaney;, 7 the state did not act as the catalyst that triggered the
actions of a third party. Joshua's father, alone, inflicted Joshua's
injuries.1 18
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the state causes the plaintiff's injuries regardless of how those injuries are defined in roadside
abandonment cases. The action by the state official not only puts the
plaintiff's bodily security at risk, but also provides the critical link in
the sequence of events resulting in the plaintiff's physical injuries.
Therefore, because abandonment constitutes affirmative action and the
state causes the injury, the plaintiff in a roadside abandonment case
satisfies section 1983's color of law requirement.
B.

Roadside Abandonment Violates the FederalRight to Due
Process Protected by Section 1983

Roadside abandonment cases also satisfy the second element
required under section 1983: violation of a federally protected right.
Although the Constitution does not explicitly define an individual's
rights in the context of roadside abandonment, a plaintiff may establish a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment by putting
forth either of two theories. First, individuals have a fundamental
right to liberty and freedom from unjustified state intrusions on personal security. Second, individuals have a fundamental right to
receive care and protection from the state whenever the state imposes
detrimental custody. Applying the balancing test applied in substantive due process analysis'1 9 demonstrates that an individual's liberty
interest outweighs the burden on the state in roadside abandonment
cases. Thus, the officer violates substantive due process by abandoning
an individual following a roadside stop and exposing that person to a
severe threat of physical injury.
L

The Liberty Right Includes Bodily Integrity

In roadside abandonment cases, the officer violates the plaintiff's
right to liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This right
includes the right to be free from unjustified government intrusions on
personal security.1 20 When an officer removes the safety afforded by
117. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
118. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203.
119. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan J., dissenting); see supra notes 36-37
and accompanying text.
120. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 & n.41 (1977); see supra note 44 and
accompanying text.
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companionship and transportation and then abandons the plaintiff, the
officer reduces the individual's personal security. By doing so, the
officer does not further any legitimate government objectives such as
protecting the safety of the community. Thus, the action is unjustified
and violates the fundamental right to liberty.
2. Custody, Causation, and Subsequent Duty
In certain situations, individuals have a fundamental right to receive
care and protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. 12 1 Imposing
detrimental custody on an individual triggers a state duty to provide
care and protection. Detrimental custody worsens individuals' positions; 122 it impairs the individuals' ability to care for themselves and to
seek help from other sources. Because the state imposes detrimental
custody in roadside abandonment cases, the state must provide affirmative aid.
The Constitution requires that states provide care and protection
after imposing detrimental custody on an individual. 123 The Supreme
Court has held that when the state maintains maximum custody
through incarceration or involuntary commitment, the state has a
duty to provide care and protection."2 Although detaining a person
awaiting trial involves a lesser degree of state custody, the state has the
same affirmative duties.12 5 On the other hand, the Court has held that
where state officials impose custody with no detrimental effect, or
impose no custody at12 6all, the state has no affirmative duty to provide
care and protection.
Because detrimental custody triggers the state's affirmative duty,
plaintiffs must establish state custody and its detrimental consequences
to prevail in roadside abandonment cases. Plaintiffs satisfy the custody requirement by establishing that they were seized within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The state seizes an individual
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when, in light of all the
121. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
123. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200
(1989); see also supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
124. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (Fourteenth Amendment requires that states
provide involuntarily committed mental patients with such services as are necessary to ensure
their reasonable safety from themselves and others); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04
(1976) (Eighth Amendment requires that states provide adequate medical care to incarcerated
prisoners).
125. Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause requires state to provide medical care to suspects in police
custody who have been injured during apprehension).
126. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., .189 U.S. 189 (1989).
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circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would
believe that he or she was not free to leave. 127 Factors that might
indicate a seizure include the threatening presence of several officers or
the display of weapons.1 28 In roadside abandonment cases, police
officers effectively restrain the plaintiff's freedom of movement, sometimes by means of several officers displaying weapons while arresting
the plaintiff's companions. 129 A reasonable person is not likely to feel
that he or she is free to walk away from this scene. This state custody
consequently reduces the individual's capacity for self-protection and
limits the availability of other help. By depriving the individual of
these protections, the officer imposes detrimental custody on the individual and thus triggers the state's own duty to provide care and
protection.
When officers tell individuals that they are free to leave, the state's
custody ends but the state's duty to provide protection remains. The
state is still liable for injuries that individuals suffer because of the
circumstances of their release."' Police officers have a duty not to
release an incapacitated individual from state custody into a perilous
situation where incapacitated persons cannot defend themselves."'
Incapacity can include intoxication or lack of protection against the
natural elements.13 2 In roadside abandonment cases, the consequences arising from the officer's action do not occur during state custody. Nevertheless, the lack of companionship and transportation
impairs the plaintiff's ability to protect himself or herself after the
officer releases the individual and departs.1 33 Thus the police officers
127. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (holding no seizure occurred
when officers approached a woman on an airport concourse, asked if they could see ticket and
identification, and then asked her a few questions).
128. Id. Other factors include physically touching the person or using language or a tone of
voice that implies that compliance with the officer's request may be compelled. Id.; see Dunaway
v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 203, 207 n.6 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968); 3
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 53-55 (1978).

129. See Courson v. McMillian, 939 F.2d 1479 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that seizure existed
when officer ordered person to lie on the ground while pointing shotgun at her; five additional
officers subsequently arrived); see also Hilliard v. City & County of Denver, 930 F.2d 1516, 1517
(10th Cir.) (multiple officers present when plaintiff's companion arrested), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
656 (1991); White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 382 (7th Cir. 1979) (multiple officers present when
arresting the uncle of three children).
130. Wagar v. Hasenkrug, 486 F. Supp. 47 (D. Mont. 1980) (officers released intoxicated
individual into abnormally inclement weather); Iglesias v. Wells, 441 N.E.2d 1017 (Ind. Ct. App.
1982) (officers released individual who lacked adequate protective clothing into harsh winter
weather); Parvi v. City of Kingston, 362 N.E.2d 960 (N.Y. 1977) (officers released intoxicated
persons near busy freeway).
131. Iglesias, 441 N.E.2d at 1021.
132. See supra note 130.
133. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
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are accountable for releasing persons who cannot defend against dangers that confront them after custody.
3. Due Process:BalancingPrivate and State Interests
After finding that the suit involves a fundamental right, courts balance the plaintiff's interests against those of the state to determine
whether the officer's action violates substantive due process.13 4 In
roadside abandonment cases, the balance tips in favor of the plaintiff's
private interests. The action of the police officer jecpardizes the significant personal interest of the plaintiff. As discussed previously, the
plaintiff may face severe consequences that arise after the officer abandons the individual. 135 The state, however, could remedy the plaintiff's plight and bear only a minimal burden. Several alternative
courses of action could significantly reduce or actually eliminate the
risk that abandonment poses to the plaintiff's personal security. The
police officer might provide the plaintiff with transportation to the
police station or to a telephone from which the plaintiff could call for a
ride home.1 36 The officer might call a taxicab. These alternatives,
which remove the individual from the peril that the state's actions created, burden the state with only minimal administrative and fiscal
costs. Furthermore, leaving the individual behind does not serve any
potential government objectives such as protecting the community.
Because the significant interests of the individual outweigh the negligible burden on the state, the officer violates the plaintiff's fundamental
liberty interest in personal security or the plaintiff's right to care and
protection arising from state custody when the police officer abandons
the plaintiff. Therefore, plaintiffs in roadside abandonment cases satisfy section 1983's requirement that the officer violate a federally protected right.
4. Imposing Liability in Roadside Abandonment Cases Does Not
Create a "No Win" Situation
Contrary to what opponents of roadside abandonment liability
might argue, imposing liability on the state for failing to provide care
and protection in roadside abandonment cases does not burden the
state with inevitable liability. In DeShaney, the Supreme Court
expressed concern that imposing liability for failing to act might bur134. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
135. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
136. Often more than one patrol car arrives when officers make an arrest for drunk driving.
See supranote 129. Also, if the officer makes arrests, the officer must transport those arrested to
the police station and thus could take the plaintiff to the station also.
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den the state with a "no win" situation.1 1 7 The Court argued that if
the State of Wisconsin had acted and removed Joshua from his father's
care, Randy DeShaney might have brought a suit under section 1983
13
for improperly interfering with the parent-child relationship. 1
Because officials at the Department of Social Services bore potential
liability for acting, the Court apparently thought it unfair to hold
them liable for failing to act.13 9
Roadside abandonment cases, however, do not impose a "no win"
situation on the state. Unlike DeShaney, the officer in an abandonment case would not be liable for offering the individual a ride to the
station or a call for a taxicab. When the police officer extends an offer
of state care and protection, the individual has a choice of whether or
not to accept that offer. If the individual accepts a ride to the station
or to a telephone, that individual cannot later claim a false arrest; the
consent obviates the arrest. 1" On the other hand, if the individual
refuses to accept, the state is not responsible for any ensuing injuries. 1 ' Whatever choice the individual makes, the state will not be
liable for acting affirmatively.
C. The Dilemma Created by the "Clearly Established Right"
Doctrine
Plaintiff's are effectively barred from recovering in roadside abandonment cases by the requirement that they demonstrate that their
constitutional right was clearly established at the time the officer
acted. Plaintiffs should be able to overcome the qualified immunity
defense by showing that the officer was deliberately indifferent to the
danger that the officer imposed on the plaintiff. In many situations,
courts will hold police officers liable for official conduct only after a
previous judicial decision has "notified" police officers that they have a
constitutional duty in a particular situation. 42 Consequently, police
officers adapt practices and policies to conform with judicially established standards. Police officers may continue other practices and policies, however, that remain unchallenged or unresolved in the courts,
without fear of liability.
137. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 203 (1989).

138. Id
139. See id
140. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983) (holding that Miranda warnings are not
required when individual not arrested but went to police station voluntarily).
141. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §496C (1965).
142. See, eg., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Under section 1983, a plaintiff is required to prcve that the defendant violated a "clearly established right" before courts will overcome
the qualified immunity defense and impose liability. 4 3 This practice,
however, also burdens plaintiffs in roadside abandonment cases with a
problem of circularity. To date, the courts that have addressed the
scope of a police officer's duty in roadside abandonment cases have
provided conflicting results. 1" As long as courts disagree, the individual's constitutional right will not be clearly established. As long as the
individual's constitutional right remains unclea:r, courts will not
impute knowledge of the plaintiff's rights to the officer.14 5 Thus, the
officer's duty also will remain unclear. Courts will continue to grant
qualified immunity to police officers in roadside abandonment cases as
long as, in the eyes of the courts, the officers do not understand their
official duty. However, so long as courts grant qualified immunity to
police officers without clarifying the scope of the individual's rights
and the officer's duty following a traffic stop, qualified immunity will
continually and effectively bar recovery.
Eliminating the circularity imposed by qualified immunity requires
that courts free plaintiffs from the requirement of showing that the
officer knew or had reason to know of the plaintiffs' constitutional
rights.14 6 Instead, courts could allow plaintiffs to overcome the qualified immunity defense by showing that the officer edibited "deliberate
indifference" regarding the safety and well-being of an individual who
is in state custody or is directly affected by the officer's actions.147 In
constitutional jurisprudence, deliberate indifference means that the
defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of a significant danger
143. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 45-63 and accompanying text.
145. In jurisdictions where the courts have clearly established the plaintiff's right, courts will
impute knowledge of the plaintiff's right to police officers. Thus, in those jurisdictions officers
will be unable to assert successfully the defense of qualified immunity.
146. At least one author has advocated eliminating any mens rea requirement in actions for
violations of due process under § 1983. See William Burnham, Separating Constitutional and
Common-Law Torts: A Critique anda ProposedConstitutionalTheory of Duty, 73 MINN. L. REv.
515, 530-31 (state of mind is irrelevant when a governmental abuse of power causes the loss); cf
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (when analyzing a
substantive due process violation, the inquiry is whether the state itself causes the plaintiff's
injuries and not whether the defendant acted with a certain level of culpability).
147. Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has helped clarify the meaning of the phrase
"deliberate indifference." See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (stating that conduct
must involve more than lack of due care for the safety of prisoners to constitute cruel and
unusual punishment); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976) ("deliberate indifference" is
manifested in "intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally
interfering with treatment once prescribed").
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and consciously disregarded that danger. 148 This new standard would
shift the focus from whether the right was clearly established to
whether officers had knowledge of and disregarded the peril caused by
their actions. Under such a standard, plaintiffs would be required to
show that the officer knew or had constructive knowledge of the plaintiff's perilous circumstances and the officer's knowledge of the law
would become irrelevant. Plaintiffs would not have to establish when
and in what situations their rights were "clearly established" and then
whether a reasonable officer should have known of those rights. Thus,
plaintiffs could recover without depending on a previous judicial decision to establish their rights.
Under the proposed standard, common law tort principles of negligence and recklessness would be insufficient to impose constitutional
liability on public officials. Consequently, public officials who make
discretionary decisions would retain qualified immunity. This would
maintain the public policy that seeks to prevent interference in the
state's ability to exercise fully its powers and carry out its functions.14 9
III.

CONCLUSION

Kathy Hilliard and others abandoned by police should have a cause
of action under section 1983 against the police officers who leave persons in perilous circumstances. Kathy satisfied the two-part test
required under section 1983. The officer, acting under color of law,
caused Kathy's injuries. The officer violated Kathy's liberty interest in
personal security as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The
officer also violated her right to receive care and protection provided
by the state, which arises when the state imposes detrimental custody.
Presently, the defense of qualified immunity effectively bars the
plaintiff from recovering by requiring that a plaintiff's constitutional
right be clearly established. Courts should limit the qualified immunity defense by focusing on whether the officer had knowledge of and
disregard for the plaintiff's peril, rather than focusing on whether
another court has previously clarified the plaintiff's constitutional
right in the eyes of the officer. Applying this standard of deliberate
indifference may allow victims of roadside abandonment to recover.
This standard also promotes the public policy that underlies the doctrine of qualified immunity; it limits recovery to cases involving con148.
hitley, 475 U.S. at 321 (1986) (citing Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th
Cir. 1985), cert denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986) ("equating 'deliberate indifference,' in an Eighth
Amendment case involving security risks, with 'recklessness in criminal law,' which 'implies an
act so dangerous that the defendant's knowledge of the risk can be inferred' ")).
149. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
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spicuous abuses of state power while permitting public servants to
vigorously fulfill their duties.
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